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et al.: Power of Courts

POWER'OF COURTS
N.Y CONST. art. VI, § 30:
The legislatureshall have the same power to alter and regulate
the jurisdiction and proceedings in law and in equity that it has
heretofore exercised. The legislature may, on such terms as it
shall provide and subject to subsequent modification, delegate, in
whole or in part, to a court, including the appellate division of
the supreme court, or to the chief administratorof the courts, any
power possessed by the legislature to regulate practice and
procedure in the courts. The chief administrator of the courts
shall exercise any such power delegated to him with the advice
and consent of the administrative board of the courts. Nothing
herein contained shall prevent the adoption of regulations by
individual courts consistent with the general practice and
procedure as provided by statute or general rules.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD DEPARTMENT
164 6
Bloom v. Crosson
(decided October 7, 1993)

The court of appeals, in a memorandum decision, affirmed the
appellate division's decision "for the reasons stated in the opinion
by Justice A. Franklin Mahoney at the appellate division." 16 47 At
the appellate division stage, the petitioner, Chief Administrator of
the Courts, appealed a decision 164 8 which held that his directive,
mandating the use of electronic recording instead of stenographic
transcription of all testimony and proceedings in the twelve fulltime Surrogate's Courts throughout the state and in eight Court of
Claims', was outside the scope of his powers under section 414
1646. 183 A.D.2d 341, 590 N.Y.S.2d 328 (3d Dep't 1992).
1647. 82 N.Y.2d 768, 771, 624 N.E.2d 175, 175, 603 N.Y.S.2d 991, 991
(1993).
1648. 152 Misc. 2d 397, 585 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1992).
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of the Session Laws1 649 and New York Constitution, article VI,
section 28(b). 1650 The third department, held that the Chief
Administrator's directive was within his statutory and
constitutional power and reversed the holding of the lower
court.

16 5 1

In April of 1992, a two year experimental measure was passed
by the Legislature where the Chief Administrator was given the
1649. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 411 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1993). Section 414
provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the chief administrator of
the courts may authorize the use of mechanical recording of testimony
and of other proceedings in each cause, in lieu of the taking of
stenographic minutes thereof, in: (i) a surrogate's court in any county;
and (ii) the court of claims.
Id.
1650. Bloom, 183 A.D.2d at 344, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 330; see also N.Y.
CONST. art. VI, § 28. Section 28 of Art. 6 of the New York State Constitution
states:
a. The chief judge of the court of appeals shall be the chief
judge of the state of New York and shall be the chief judicial
officer of the unified court system. There shall be an
administrative board of the courts which shall consist of the
chief judge of the court of appeals as chairman and the
presiding justice of the appellate division of the supreme
court of each judicial department. The chief judge shall, with
the advice and consent of the administrative board of the
courts, appoint a chief administrator of the courts who shall
serve at his pleasure.
b. The chief administrator, on behalf of the chief judge, shall
supervise the administration and operation of the unified
court system. In the exercise of such responsibility, the chief
administrator of the courts shall have such powers and duties
as may be delegated to him by the chief judge and such
additional powers and duties as may be provided by law.
c.
The chief judge, after consultation with the administrative
board, shall establish standards and administrative policies
for general application throughout the state, which shall be
submitted by the chief judge to the court of appeals, together
with the recommendations, if any, of the administrative
board. Such standards and administrative policies shall be
promulgated after approval by the court of appeals.
Id.
1651. Bloom, 183 A.D.2d at 346, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
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authority to implement in a Surrogate Court in any county, and
the Court of Claims, a program that would have replaced
stenographers. After consultation and approval from the Chief
Judge regarding implementation of a plan pursuant to section 414
of the session laws, and a presentation to the Administrative
Board of the Courts, the Chief Administrator launched a directive
regarding the use of electronic recording in the courts. 1652 The

Chief Administrator announced that on May 21, 1992, it would
be mandatory to use electronic recording in "12 full-time
Surrogate's Courts throughout the State and in eight Courts of
16 5 3
Claims" for all testimony and proceedings.
In response to the mandatory directive, plaintiffs, who were
"'elected officials from the affected jurisdictions, court
stenographers who were involuntarily reassigned,... members
of the Bar ...and individuals who had cases pending in

Surrogate's Court" commenced an action against the Chief
Administrator to prevent the implementation of the
directives. 1654 The plaintiffs argued that the action taken by the
Chief Administrator was not authorized by New York
Constitution, article VI, section 30.1655 According to article VI,
section 30, the Legislator has the power to govern jurisdiction,
1652. Id. at 343, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 329.
1653. Id.
1654. Id.

1655. Id. at 344, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 330; see also N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 30.
Section 30 of article VI states:
The legislature shall have the same power to alter and regulate the
jurisdiction and proceedings in law and in equity that it has heretofore
exercised. The legislature may, on such terms as it shall provide and
subject to subsequent modification, delegate, in whole or in part, to a
court, including the appellate division of the supreme court, or to the
chief administrator of the courts, any power possessed by the legislature
to regulate practice and procedure in the courts. The chief administrator
of the courts shall exercise any such power delegated to him with the
advice and consent of the administrative board of the courts. Nothing
herein contained shall prevent the adoption of regulations by individual
courts consistent with the general practice and procedure as provided by
statute or general rules.
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practice and procedure issues dealing with the court system.1656
This power can be delegated to the Chief Administrator,
however, no exercise of this power will be valid without "the
advice and consent of the administrative board of the courts." 1657
Therefore, plaintiffs argued that because no consent was given by
the administrative board, the directive is invalid. 1658
The Chief Administrator argued that the directive was not an
action in practice or procedure, but rather was administrative in
character and therefore, article VI, section 28 was controlling in
this case. 1659 Article VI, section 28(b) states: "the Chief
Administrator, on behalf of the Chief Judge, shall supervise the
administration and operation of the unified court system."' 1660
Under section 28(b), the Chief Administrator does not need the
consent of the administrative board to take any action dealing
with administrative matters of the court system. 1661
The third department held that the directive by the Chief
Administrator was administrative in character. 1662 The court, in
coming to its conclusion, referred to Judiciary Law section
211.1663 Judiciary Law, section 211, defines the administrative
functions of the Chief Judge of the court of appeals and
subsection (d) states that the Chief Judge shall preside over
"personnel practices affecting non judicial personnel." 1664
Additionally, subsection (f) states that part of the Chief Judge's
duties includes "the form, content, maintenance and disposition

1656. Bloom, 183 A.D.2d at 344, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
1657. Id.
1658. Id.

1659. Id.
1660. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 28(b).
1661. Bloom, 183 A.D.2d at 344, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
1662. Id.; see also Yeager v. Quinn, 767 P.2d 766 (1988) (upholding Chief
Justice's directive of replacing county court reporters with electronic recording
devices stating that it was administrative in nature); Licter v. County of
Monmouth, 276 A.2d 382 (1971) (upholding Chief Administrator's decision to
install sound recording devices stating that directive was statutorily authorized
and administrative in nature).
1663. Bloom, 183 A.D.2d at 344, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
1664. 183 A.D.2d at 344, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 330; JUD. LAW § 211(d).
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of court records." 1665 Relying on the wording of the statute, the
court concluded that the Chief Administrator's plan was
16 66
administrative in nature.
The court's conclusion that the directive was administrative in
nature did not, however, end the dispute. 1667 The issue then
became whether the Chief Administrator had the authority to deal
with this challenged action. 1668 In deciding this issue, the court
turned again to article VI, section 28(b) of the New York
Constitution. The court stated that "[u]nder... article VI,
§ 28(b), the Chief Administrator's authority to deal with
administrative matters derives from two sources: 1. authority
delegated by the Chief Judge who constitutionally is imbued with
plenary authority over matters of administration and 2. authority
conferred by some other provision of law. " 1669 The plaintiffs
strongly argued that the directive was not a power delegated to
the Chief Judge and therefore the Chief Administrator did not
have authority to act in this case. 1670
However, the court did not pass on the issue of whether the
Chief Administrator was imbued with powers delegated by the
Chief Judge. Instead, the court held that the Chief Administrator
was given authority to deal with administrative functions
conferred to him by a provision of law. 167 1 The court stated that
New York Session Law 1992, chapter 55, section 414 was
independent law conferring authority to the Chief Administrator

1665.
1666.
1667.
1668.
1669.

Id. at 344, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 330; Jun. LAW § 211(f).
Id. at 344, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
Id. at 344-45, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
Id.
Id. at 345, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 330; N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §28(b). For a

case where the New York Court of Appeals held that the administrator's
authority derived from delegated powers of the Chief Judge, see Corkum v.
Bartlett, 46 N.Y.2d 424, 386 N.E.2d 1066, 414 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1979), in which

the court held that public hearings set up by the Chief Administrator dealing
with proposed classification of nonjudicial employees was a power properly
delegated by the Chief Judge.
1670. Id. at 345, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
1671. Id.
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to deal with the administrative issue at bar. 1672 Section 414
states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Chief
Administrator of the courts may authorize the use of mechanical
recording of testimony and of other proceedings in each cause, in
lieu of the taking of stenographic minutes thereof, in (i) a
Surrogate's Court in any county; and (ii) the Court of
73
Claims. 16
In holding that section 414 gave the Chief Administrator power
to make the directive at issue, the court reasoned that the "overall
spirit and purpose" of the law was to cut costs of the expensive
judicial process. 1674 The court referred to the 1992 New York
State Legislative Report of the Fiscal Committees on the
Executive Budged which contemplated the 2.6 million dollar cost
savings with the implementation of mechanical recording in the
courtroom. 1675 Specifically, the court stated that the Legislature
noted in the Report that "the full implementation" of section 414
was needed in order to realize the savings proposed. 1676
Therefore, the court concluded that the Chief Administrator had
the power to make the program at issue mandatory. 1677
In the federal court system, however, there is no position held
that is analogous to the Chief Administrator of the New York
court system. The United States Constitution confers authority
over the federal court system to Congress. 1678 In 1982, Congress

1672. Id. at 345, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 331; see 1992 N.Y. Laws 55.

1673. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 414 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1993).
1674. 183 A.D.2d at 345, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 331; see also Sutka v. Conners,
73 N.Y.2d 395, 538 N.E.2d 1012, 541 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1989) (stating that
when a statute is being interpreted legislative intent may be found in the text's
overall "spirit and purpose").

1675. Id. at 345-46, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
1676. Id. at 346, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
1677. Id.
1678. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Article III, section 1 provides:
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior

courts, shall hold their Offices during Good Behavior, and shall, at
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passed -the Federal Court Improvement Act1679 in which the use
of mechanical and electronic reporting of testimony was allowed
1680
as a substitute for stenographic recording of testimony.
Section 753(b) of the United States Code states that all
proceedings of the court "shall be recorded verbatim by
shorthand, mechanical means, electronic sound recording, or any
other method, subject to regulations promulgated by the Judicial
Conference and subject to the discretion and approval of the
judge." 168 1 Thug, each individual judge has great discretion as to
how the recording of testimony will be taken in that judge's
courtroom. 1682 In New York, the Constitution empowers the
Chief Administrator with authority over judicial administration
including recording of courtroom proceedings while the federal
system empowers Congress with judicial administration and gives
great discretion to each judge as to how testimony will be
recorded.

stated Times, receive for their services, a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in Office.
Id.
1679. 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (1993).
1680. See 28 U.S.C. § 753(b); see also United States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375,
377 (l1th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1034 (1984) (testimony recorded
by electronic devices pursuant to an experimental program passed by
Congress).
1681. 28 U.S.C. § 753(b).
1682. See Sims, 719 F.2d at 379.
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